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19 
VOTING RIGHTS DISCLOSURE 
Spencer Overton∗ 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County 
v. Holder1 to scale back parts of the Voting Rights Act of 19652 (VRA), 
the question is, what’s next?  Professor Samuel Issacharoff’s comment 
Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting attempts to provide an 
answer.3  Issacharoff describes section 5 of the VRA as an outdated, 
race-based, command-and-control, ex ante approach to regulation that 
misses “major voting concerns of recent years”4 — including restrictive 
voter identification laws and restrictions on access to early voting — 
which stem from “Republican control” of state legislatures.5  
Issacharoff asserts that “[i]nstead of the limited race-driven use of 
equal protection and the Fifteenth Amendment, there is untested room 
for expansion of congressional intervention under the Elections 
Clause.”6  In exercising this “expansive” power under the Elections 
Clause, Issacharoff proposes that Congress compel “states to disclose 
alterations of voting rules or practices, as they will affect the conduct 
of federal elections.”7 
I agree with Issacharoff and several other scholars that disclosure 
holds promise as a significant tool to protect voting rights.8  More 
transparency would deter unfair voting practices, increase legal com-
pliance, and reduce the amount and cost of litigation.  I also appreciate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  Ian Bassin, Bruce Cain, 
David Fontana, Heather Gerken, Justin Levitt, Mark Posner, Jason Qu, Franita Tolson, Fane 
Wolfer, Brenda Wright, and William Yeomans provided comments that helped develop my think-
ing.  Lyndsay Steinmetz provided invaluable research assistance. 
 1 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 3 Samuel Issacharoff, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term — Comment: Beyond the Discrimina-
tion Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013). 
 4 Id. at 112. 
 5 Id. at 103. 
 6 Id. at 113. 
 7 Id. at 120. 
 8 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Essay, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and 
the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 724 (2006) (proposing that states and localities 
disclose new election law changes in a publicly accessible format, so that community leaders and 
public interest groups can negotiate the changes with them); Bruce Cain & Daniel P. Tokaji, Pro-
moting Equal Participation: A Voting Rights Act for the 21st Century, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 
23, 2009, 12:04 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013914.html (proposing that states and 
localities “be required to issue an ‘electoral impact statement,’ analogous to environmental impact 
statements”); see also Spencer Overton, How to Update the Voting Rights Act, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 25, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/spencer-overton/how-to-update 
-the-voting_b_3497350.html (proposing that Congress modernize the VRA by requiring disclosure 
and detailing the benefits of disclosure). 
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that Issacharoff’s disclosure regime is nationwide (thereby avoiding 
problems with the preclearance coverage formula identified by the 
Court in Shelby County), and that it facilitates both private and public 
enforcement.  I also agree that both Congress and the states should 
take steps to curb politicians’ manipulations of voting rules and make 
voting more accessible for all Americans.  
Yet the benefits of congressional interventions under the Elections 
Clause should not prompt us to abandon the Fifteenth Amendment.  
Attempts to protect “access to the franchise” for all Americans need 
not displace a commitment to craft modern tools that prevent voting 
discrimination.  There is no reason the two regimes cannot coexist, 
since they address separate, legitimate goals. 
Indeed, absent a strong commitment to preventing voting discrimi-
nation, Issacharoff’s approach alone is incomplete.  For example, 
Issacharoff’s Elections Clause–based disclosure proposal applies only 
to federal elections.  Congress should also use the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to require disclosure in state and local elections.  Further, while 
disclosure is important, it is not enough.  Rather than abandon pre-
clearance, Congress should update preclearance by tying coverage to 
areas with recent voting rights violations.  Congress should also stream-
line voting rights litigation to make it more efficient and effective. 
I.  RACE MATTERS 
Issacharoff sees the “major voting concerns of recent years” not as 
discrimination against voters of color, but as partisan efforts “to re-
strict . . . access [to the franchise] in order to diminish the political im-
pact of vulnerable constituencies.”9  Examples include restrictive voter 
identification, the rollback of early voting times and places, and regula-
tions that make voter registration more difficult.10  According to 
Issacharoff, the likely site of these new, major voting concerns is not the 
South, but presidential battleground states such as Ohio.11  Issacharoff 
acknowledges that these laws “likely had . . . a disparate racial im-
pact,”12 but he argues that race is just one avenue in which politicians 
violate their duties to voters to gain advantage.  Others include “parti-
sanship, personal gain, political favoritism, or outright corruption.”13 
Echoing the language of race-neutral affirmative action skeptics, 
Issacharoff suggests that there exists an “increasing mismatch between 
the narrow civil rights model and the nature of contemporary threats 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 103. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. at 104. 
 12 Id. at 103. 
 13 Id. at 113. 
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to the right to vote.”14  Rather than continue to live in the past, 
Issacharoff urges us to look beyond the discrimination model on vot-
ing.  In updating the VRA, Issacharoff asserts that “[i]nstead of the 
limited race-driven use of equal protection and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, there is untested room for expansion of congressional interven-
tion under the Elections Clause.”15  Issacharoff offers what he  
describes as a “new model,” based on “a non–civil rights vision”16 that 
would help “insulate the right to vote from naked efforts at partisan 
manipulation.”17 
While the desire to minimize race is understandable in light of 
dramatic improvements in race relations in the past fifty years, dis-
counting the need to prevent racial discrimination is a mistake.  In 
many parts of the country, many whites and people of color cast bal-
lots for different candidates along racial lines, and some political oper-
atives try to benefit from this racially polarized voting by manipulat-
ing election rules to lower turnout or dilute the votes of racial or 
language minorities.  Although Issacharoff largely cabins this problem 
into a 1965 black/white framework, the problem is increasing in many 
areas, due in large part to fast-growing populations of Latinos and 
Asian Americans that threaten the political status quo, as well as the 
fact that voting patterns of different racial groups in many areas are 
becoming increasingly divergent.  Nueces County, Texas, provides a 
recent example.  After the rapidly growing Latino community sur-
passed fifty-six percent of its population, the county gerrymandered lo-
cal election districts to diminish the influence of Latino voters.  The 
section 5 preclearance process blocked Nueces County’s racial gerry-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 Id. at 120. 
 15 Id. at 113. 
 16 Id. at 104. 
 17 Id. at 106.  Issacharoff is part of a school of scholars who have recently pushed for a shift 
from preventing discrimination to general election reform.  See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Fu-
ture of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741 
(2006); Rick Pildes & Daniel P. Tokaji, What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?: The Gap Be-
tween Perception and Reality, ELECTION L. BLOG (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:39 AM), http:// 
electionlawblog.org/?p=54521 (asserting that other tools may be more effective than section 5 at 
protecting access, including voter registration modernization, disclosure about voting systems, and 
reasonable identification requirements); Eric Posner & Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Don’t Worry 
About the Voting Rights Act, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2012, 3:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news 
_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/11/supreme_court_and_section_5_of_the_voting_rights_act
_it_s_ok_to_strike_it.html (“[A]ttention . . . should be focused less on the Voting Rights Act, and 
more on electoral reform that limits gerrymandering.”).  Many of these voting rights scholars seem 
to borrow from the facially race-neutral trend in the affirmative action context (for example, 
class-based preferences) without distinguishing educational admissions and voting.  Race-
consciousness in educational admissions is designed to advance diversity, whereas voting rights 
protections aim to prevent contemporary discrimination by politicians who use race as a predictor 
of voting preferences in order to manipulate voting rules. 
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mandering in 2012.18  And in Runnels County, Texas, where ninety 
percent of Latino voters speak Spanish at home, the county defied a 
court order requiring that every polling place have at least one bilin-
gual poll worker — in November 2009, not one county polling place 
satisfied that requirement.19 
Part of the problem is Issacharoff’s characterization of section 5 as 
limited to blocking access-based discrimination.  Issacharoff writes 
that, by the 1980s,20 section 5 “had accomplished much of its purpose, 
removing the literacy tests and other barriers to black enfranchise-
ment,”21 and that “section 5 was receding in importance as voting 
rights moved into the domain of political power, not simply access to 
the franchise.”22  This argument downplays, however, the language of 
section 5 itself, which requires preclearance not just of a change to 
“any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,” but also of a 
change to “any . . . standard, practice, or procedure with respect to 
voting.”23  The Justice Department followed the express intent of Con-
gress and originally enforced section 5 to apply to all voting changes 
(not just changes relating to access to voting).  The Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Allen v. State Board of Elections24 affirmed such an appli-
cation.25  Generally, problematic jurisdictions did not try to reintro-
duce voting tests and devices but instead enacted measures that dis-
criminated through other means, particularly by dilutive redistricting, 
methods of elections, and annexations.26   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Joseph M. Nixon, Esq. et al. (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt 
/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_020712.pdf.  
 19 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, to Elesa Ocker, Cnty. Clerk, Runnels Cnty., Tex. (June 28, 2010), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_062810.pdf. 
 20 Issacharoff describes the 1990s as a period of “a brief reawakening” of section 5 due to the 
Justice Department’s “so-called ‘max black’ strategy.”  Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 98.  I agree the 
Supreme Court concluded that the Justice Department misapplied section 5 to a few statewide 
plans, but those instances were not representative of the vast majority of objections lodged during 
the 1990s. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 97. 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
 24 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 25 Id. at 565–66, 568 (recognizing that section 5 was “aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvi-
ous, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their 
race,” id. at 565, and concluding that Congress intended that “all changes, no matter how small, 
be subjected to § 5 scrutiny,” id. at 568); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 
180–81 (1980) (finding that Congress recognized in 1975 the critical role that section 5 played in 
addressing discriminatory dilutive measures enacted after literacy tests and other barriers to black 
enfranchisement had been removed). 
 26 See also Voting Rights Act After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Shelby County: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
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Voting discrimination is not simply political gerrymandering, but a 
special problem that warrants unique protections.  Diminishing minor-
ity votes does not become acceptable because it is motivated by politi-
cal gain rather than racial animus.  Historically, political operatives 
have excluded minorities for political purposes.  Politicians shut out 
African Americans in the late 1800s because many voted Republican.  
They also excluded African Americans in the 1900s because many 
would have voted for pro-integration candidates.27  Diminishing the 
votes of minorities poses special dangers because it reduces incentives 
for cross-racial coalitions, increases incentives for politicians to scape-
goat minorities, and fuels racial division.  The unique dangers of vot-
ing discrimination are so significant that we altered the Constitution 
through the Fifteenth Amendment to prevent the practice. 
Granted, it is important to protect the voting rights of all Ameri-
cans.  There is no reason, however, that we must retreat from strong 
protections to prevent racial discrimination in voting or abandon con-
gressional use of the Fifteenth Amendment.28  Choosing between the 
Fifteenth Amendment and the Elections Clause is a false choice.  We 
can simultaneously work to prevent racial discrimination in voting and 
improve election administration for voting for all Americans.  The 
1960s and 1970s yielded the passage and extension of both a VRA that 
prevented voting discrimination and various legal directives that  
expanded voting rights to new residents, members of the military, 
eighteen-year-olds, and those unable to pay a poll tax.29 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
113th Cong. 52–53 (2013) (statement of Spencer Overton, Professor of Law, The George Washing-
ton University Law School). 
 27 Issacharoff acknowledges the historic connection between political strategy and voting dis-
crimination, but he fails to expand upon the unique implications of it.  See Issacharoff, supra note 
3, at 97 n.10. 
 28 See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting 
Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (arguing that the Elections Clause as well as the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments validate the VRA preclearance regime as it applies to local, 
state, and federal elections). 
 29 While Issacharoff purports to describe a new “non–civil rights” model, Issacharoff, supra 
note 3, at 104, Fourteenth Amendment challenges to restrictions on voting and the extensive  
power Congress enjoys over federal elections have been recognized for decades, see Ex parte 
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384 (1879) (“[T]he regulations [for federal elections] made by Congress are 
paramount to those made by the State legislature; and if they conflict therewith, the latter, so far 
as the conflict extends, ceases to be operative.”).  Several other decisions have used the Fourteenth 
Amendment to invalidate restrictions on the fundamental right to vote.  See, e.g., Dunn v.  
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating a Tennessee restriction that limited voting to people 
who had lived in the state for at least a year); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 
621 (1969) (invalidating a New York restriction that disqualified individuals who did not own or 
lease taxable real property or did not have children enrolled in the local public schools from vot-
ing for school district elections); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating 
Virginia’s poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (invalidating a Texas restriction that 
disqualified active members of the military who did not live in Texas at the time they entered 
their service from voting).  Granted, pushing general federal election reforms that seem parti-
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When Issacharoff actually proposes legislation implementing his 
new “non–civil rights” model, even he is not “beyond” race.  He re-
quires disclosure of the anticipated effect on access to the ballot “and 
any known anticipated impact on minority voters in particular.”30  
This is the right policy, as a disclosure requirement without a consid-
eration of race would be woefully inadequate,31 but it illustrates that a 
“non–civil rights” perspective can go only so far. 
II.  EXPAND DISCLOSURE 
Instead of limiting disclosure to federal elections, I would expand 
disclosure to include federal, state, and local elections.  I would also 
require more detailed demographic information in areas with signifi-
cant minority populations and racially polarized voting, particularly 
for redistricting, annexations, and other changes that may dilute mi-
nority voting strength without impeding voter access. 
Issacharoff touts the “broad” power of the Elections Clause as pref-
erable to the “limited race-driven use” of the Fifteenth Amendment,32 
but his choice to move “beyond” racial discrimination limits his pro-
posal to federal elections.  As a result, Issacharoff’s disclosure proposal 
misses manipulation of local election rules for offices such as sheriff, 
county commissioner, city council, or school board member.  These of-
fices are often nonpartisan and escape national attention, but they 
make important decisions related to schools, criminal justice, health 
and family services, and economic opportunity that directly affect our 
daily lives. 
Granted, most states have elections for state and federal offices at 
the same time, and thus Issacharoff’s federal disclosure proposal would 
cover many voting changes that simultaneously apply to federal, state, 
and local elections (for example, voter identification, early vote roll-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
san — like relaxed photo identification requirements and mandatory early voting — may prevent 
bipartisan agreement on updating the VRA and may endanger protections against voting discrim-
ination upon which Democrats and Republicans can agree.  See Spencer Overton, Against a 
“Post-Racial” Voting Rights Act, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 21, 2013), http://prospect.org/article 
/against-post-racial-voting-rights-act.  Nevertheless, aside from strategic decisions about the prop-
er venues to make arguments, we should press for both measures that prevent voting discrimina-
tion and those that protect voting rights for all Americans.  We should not use the vacuum created 
by Shelby County as an opportunity to push general election reform while abandoning the quest 
for tools to effectively prevent voting discrimination. 
 30 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 121. 
 31 This approach modifies and improves upon an earlier nonracial approach in the New Re-
public, in which Issacharoff claims disclosure “would not be triggered by racial concerns,” and 
articulates factors that would not request basic information about the racial and language minori-
ty populations affected by voting changes.  See Samuel Issacharoff, So the VRA Is Gutted. Here’s 
How to Still Fight Voter Discrimination, NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2013), http://www 
.newrepublic.com/article/113672/voting-rights-act-overturned-how-still-fight-voter-discrimination. 
 32 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 113. 
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back, and registration rules).  Issacharoff’s rule, however, would not 
disclose the bulk of unfair local and state activity.  At least 86.4% of all 
election changes that resulted in section 5 objections since 2000 would 
not have been disclosed under Issacharoff’s proposal.33  That is be-
cause even when federal, state, and local elections are conducted at the 
same time, many important changes would remain undisclosed under 
Issacharoff’s proposal, including state and local redistricting (such as in 
Nueces County, Texas) and changes to special elections, candidate 
qualifications, the method of elections, and the structure of government 
(for example, reductions in the number of members of a county com-
mission).  Also, Issacharoff’s proposal would not disclose local annexa-
tions, consolidations, or divisions of political units.   
These local changes, however, would benefit the most from disclo-
sure.  American democracy is unique because state, county, and munic-
ipal officials have great discretion with respect to promulgating and 
administering election rules.  There are, for example, over 3000 coun-
ties in the United States.  While decentralization breeds innovation, it 
also obscures the adverse effects of a regulatory change in one locality. 
Issacharoff acknowledges that his proposal does not aspire to 
“comprehensive perfection, but to a regulatory approach that captures 
more of the contemporary issues than one designed in 1965.”34  The  
effects of many of the statewide “contemporary issues” he lists, howev-
er — such as photo identification and early vote rollback in swing 
states — would be publicly debated and analyzed even without disclo-
sure.  These statewide changes generally receive statewide and often 
national press coverage; and they can spur public education, legislative 
advocacy, and lawsuits funded by state and national political cam-
paigns, good government groups, and civil rights groups.  Indeed, two 
national advocacy groups already monitor and periodically report on 
restrictive voting bills in state legislatures.35 
Local changes, in contrast, often do not appear in the New York 
Times or Washington Post.  Voters in places such as Runnels County, 
Texas (population 11,500), often lack the thousands and sometimes 
millions of dollars necessary to bring a lawsuit to challenge an unfair 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 Percentages were determined by an analysis of objections posted by the Department of Justice.  
See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 Objection Determinations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/obj_activ.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
 34 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 123. 
 35 See, e.g., Erin Ferns Lee, Election Legislation 2013: Legislative Threats and Opportunities, 
PROJECT VOTE (Sept. 2013), http://projectvote.org/images/publications/Threats%20and 
% 2 0 O p p o r t u n it i e s / S e p t e m b e r % 2 0 2 0 1 3 / E L E C T I O N - L E G I S L A T I O N - 2 0 1 3 - T h r e a t s -and 
-Opportunities-September-2013.pdf; Voting Laws Roundup 2013, BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
JUST., http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2013-voting-laws-roundup (last updated 
Nov. 4, 2013) (reporting that at least ninety restrictive bills were introduced in thirty-one states 
between January 1, 2013, and October 24, 2013). 
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local election change.  Not only does Issacharoff’s disclosure proposal 
fall short of “comprehensive perfection,” it also misses the vast majori-
ty of the types of changes that have been problematic in recent years 
and that are most in need of disclosure.   
Aside from failing to require disclosure of local election changes, 
Issacharoff’s plan falls short in other ways.  While Issacharoff would 
require a reporting of “all changes made to election practice,” the vot-
ing impact statement “need not be elaborate, only a statement of the 
likely anticipated effect on access to the ballot and any known antici-
pated impact on minority voters in particular.”36  This “access to the 
ballot” seems to focus on regulations that make voting harder, such as 
restrictions on early vote opportunities (certainly a reasonable reading 
by an election official looking to avoid disclosure), and if so would 
miss racial manipulation of other voting rules implemented to dilute 
minority voting strength. 
Discriminatory practices can diminish the impact of minority votes 
without diminishing formal “access to the ballot.”  For example, while 
the discriminatory gerrymander in Nueces County split up the votes of 
Latinos, it did not reduce the number of Latinos who voted.  Similarly, 
the city council of Calera, Alabama, lost its sole African American 
member after officials redrew the only city council district that had a 
majority African American constituency in 2006; that district dropped 
from seventy percent to thirty percent African American.37  Another 
example: In 2010, African Americans in Augusta-Richmond, Georgia, 
made up a much larger percentage of the electorate in elections held in 
November (52 percent) than in elections held in July (43 percent);38 
two years later, officials moved local elections from November back to 
July.39  Other changes in which discriminatory effects might not be 
disclosed under an “access to the ballot” standard include changes to 
candidate qualifications, the method of elections, the structure of gov-
ernment, and local annexations, consolidations, or divisions of political 
units.   
Further, despite extensive criticism of command-and-control, ex 
ante civil rights regulation (a criticism that would counsel in favor of 
repealing the ban on literacy tests), Issacharoff does not articulate a 
fully theorized view of disclosure.  As a result, important larger norma-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 121 (emphasis added). 
 37 See Letter from Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., 
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Dan Head, Esq. (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt 
/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_082508.pdf. 
 38 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, to Dennis R. Dunn, Esq., Deputy Attorney Gen., Attorney Gen. of Ga. (Dec. 21, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_122112_ga.pdf. 
 39 See id. 
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tive questions remain unanswered, such as how to balance the need for 
detailed and effective disclosure with reasonable, nonburdensome  
reporting requirements that are both politically and constitutionally 
feasible. 
While Issacharoff’s Elections Clause disclosure proposal is limited 
to federal elections, I propose that Congress adopt a disclosure regime 
covering federal, state, and local elections based on the Fifteenth 
Amendment and the Elections Clause. 
Enhanced disclosure rules are needed now in state and local elec-
tions in large part because the Court has rolled back preclearance.  
The primary benefit of preclearance was disclosure of all local voting 
changes in particular jurisdictions, which deterred countless numbers 
of unfair election changes that were either withdrawn or never submit-
ted.  The law required that all or parts of fifteen states and localities 
submit all proposed changes to election rules to federal officials for re-
view.  Politicians in covered states and localities knew that the effects 
of all new election rules would be reviewed, and this comprehensive 
disclosure deterred a great deal of bad activity.  Preclearance increased 
states’ and localities’ compliance with the Act and thereby reduced the 
amount and cost of litigation, both to voters and to governments. 
Various factors, including the pervasiveness of racially polarized 
voting, political campaigns’ and parties’ attention to the racial compo-
sition of election districts, and the relatively minor burden of disclo-
sure on states (especially compared with preclearance), suggest that 
such federal, state, and local disclosure would be appropriate nation-
wide in areas with significant minority populations.40  The Court has 
already recognized that disclosure is less burdensome than absolute re-
strictions in the election context.41  Voting rights disclosure that applies 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 In Shelby County, the Court did not resolve whether federal voting rights legislation enact-
ed pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment should be reviewed by courts using a “rationality” 
standard or a “congruence and proportionality” standard.  Compare South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (holding that the Court will only examine whether Congress 
has chosen a “rational” means of enforcing its Fifteenth Amendment powers), with City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1997) (acknowledging several cases in which federal voting rights 
protections have been held constitutional despite burdens placed on the states — including the 
nationwide ban on literacy tests in Katzenbach v. Morgan — and noting that “[t]here must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end,” id. at 520).  See also Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of 
Minimalism 10 (Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of Law & Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 
2013-116, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291612 (“Shelby 
County ignores the Boerne/Katzenbach standard of review question entirely (the majority fails 
even to cite Boerne in its opinion) . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  As discussed below, a reasonable dis-
closure regime would satisfy either standard. 
 41 The Court has already weighed the burdens of disclosure on important constitutional inter-
ests in the campaign finance, lobbying, and petition-gathering contexts, and upheld disclosure.  
Although a relatively low percentage of campaign contributions over $200 and independent ex-
penditures over $250 may be corrupting and disclosure may deter campaign contributions and 
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to federal, state, and local election changes is “rational” and “congruent 
and proportional” to preventing and remedying discrimination. 
While Issacharoff would require disclosure of  the “likely anticipat-
ed effect on access to the ballot and any known anticipated impact on 
minority voters in particular,”42 I would require more.  In states and 
localities with significant minority populations and racially polarized 
voting, I would require disclosure of information identifying the anti-
cipated effect of all types of voting changes on racial and language mi-
norities (not just voter access changes).  For redistricting and for an-
nexations, consolidations, and divisions of political units, I would 
require demographic information about the voting-age population of 
the jurisdiction before and after the change, maps of the location of 
minorities, and the previous and new boundaries of voting districts.43 
The disclosure regime should also grapple with practical details, 
such as the need to prevent jurisdictions from circumventing true dis-
closure through misreporting or providing technically true but incom-
plete reporting.  It should also provide enforcement measures for  
noncompliance (many states currently fail to comply with existing fed-
eral requirements to disclose the numbers of voters registered in  
department of motor vehicles’ offices, public assistance offices, and 
disability offices). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
independent expenditures, the Supreme Court has upheld disclosure of contributions and expendi-
tures.  The Court found such disclosure valuable in deterring corruption, providing information 
helpful to voters, and aiding in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws.  See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976) (per curiam); see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (uphold-
ing in an 8–1 vote disclosure of referendum petition signatures); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 915–16 (2010) (stating that “the informational interest alone is sufficient to justify” the 
challenged disclosure provisions); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (upholding 
registration and disclosure mandates on lobbyists, even though Congress lacks the power to ban 
lobbying).  The Court has recognized that “disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more com-
prehensive regulations of speech” such as absolute bans on activity.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 
915; see also id. at 914 (“Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, 
but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from 
speaking.’” (first quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, and then quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 
93, 201 (2003))).  By analogy, disclosure of all federal, state, and local voting changes would deter 
discrimination, provide critical information to citizens in successfully voting, and aid in the en-
forcement of other voting rights protections.  Even though a relatively low percentage of voting 
changes may be discriminatory and jurisdictions may experience slight burdens in submitting in-
formation, disclosure of voting changes is reasonable.  Disclosure of voting changes is much less 
restrictive than preclearance, as disclosure alone does not prevent any jurisdiction from enacting a 
voting change.  Disclosure is also less restrictive than other regulations the Court has upheld, such 
as the nationwide ban on literacy tests that applies to federal, state, and local elections.  See 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 42 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 121. 
 43 This information, like the bulk of the information required by the Issacharoff disclosure 
proposal, was required to be submitted to the Justice Department under the preclearance admin-
istrative regulations.  See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.27–.28 (2013).  
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I agree with Issacharoff’s borrowing of Dodd-Frank’s requirement 
that a responsible official should sign, under oath, to affirm that the 
submitted information is true, but more details are needed.  Many in-
sights may come from disclosure in other fields — including not just 
securities disclosure and environmental impact statements, but also 
campaign finance disclosure and antitrust requirements for mergers.  
Areas that require disclosure to advance civil rights enforcement might 
provide particular insights, such as state laws requiring racial impact 
statements for new criminal law legislation, equal employment oppor-
tunity disclosure, and preclearance rules that require disclosure.  That 
said, one cannot assume that the specifics of disclosure in one context 
will be identical to disclosure in a different context.  For example, se-
curities and environmental impact statement disclosures are detailed 
and lengthy, whereas the voting context may require less extensive dis-
closure due to constitutional considerations. 
III.  BEYOND DISCLOSURE 
While Professor Issacharoff criticizes preclearance and focuses on 
disclosure alone to update the VRA, I believe Congress should also 
update preclearance and the voting rights litigation process.  Some ju-
risdictions with recent voting rights violations should be required to 
produce more detailed information than would be required by the dis-
closure proposals above, and this information should be scrutinized by 
experts before these particular jurisdictions implement their voting 
changes.  Disclosure is important, but it is not enough. 
Even if geographic section 5 preclearance coverage is more limited 
in the future, it still has a role in dealing with the worst offenders.  
Issacharoff described preclearance as a “fixed rule trying to hold back 
the subtle changes of politics”44 — a “static regulatory structure” un-
able to account for changed circumstances and the dynamic nature of 
politics.45  In fact, preclearance was not a fixed prohibition on a dis-
criminatory practice (unlike, say, the ban on literacy tests), and it could 
adapt and prevent new forms of discrimination that were unforesee-
able in 1965 or even in 2000.46  It accommodated decentralization, di-
versity, and innovation by allowing jurisdictions to devise all types of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 117. 
 45 Id. (quoting Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post–Shelby County 
Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131, 132 (2013)) (internal quotation marks  
omitted). 
 46 See Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the Extent of the 
VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 955 (2011) (asserting 
that “preclearance has operated as a regime of forced disclosure, or ‘information-pushing’” and 
that preclearance is consistent with “new institutionalist” models of administration rather than 
centralized command-and-control regulation). 
  
30 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 127:19 
 
rules as long as they could simply show that they did not discriminate 
against people of color.  It was — as many regulatory devices are — 
less expensive and more efficient, effective, and expeditious than litiga-
tion.  While Issacharoff touts independent election administration as 
the “most attractive” alternative after Shelby County47 (which 
Issacharoff concedes is unrealistic for political reasons48), the preclear-
ance procedure gave state and local politicians in covered jurisdictions 
wide discretion to administer elections, but used generally independent 
administrative experts to review each change and ensure that it was 
not discriminatory.  Contrary to Issacharoff’s suggestion, Shelby Coun-
ty did not strike down the ex ante race-discrimination nature of pre-
clearance.49  The case simply held that the coverage formula was out-
dated.50  The answer to Shelby County is not to abandon the Fifteenth 
Amendment or preclearance as a tool, but to devise a coverage process 
that is more current and dynamic — making it easier to bail in to pre-
clearance — and to seriously time-limit the preclearance, and to ensure 
that it is supervised by a court. 
In updating preclearance, Congress should amend the section 3(c) 
bail-in provision of the VRA,51 so that jurisdictions that commit a  
voting rights violation — including not just those motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose, but also those that simply had a discriminatory 
effect — may be ordered by a court to preclear future election changes 
for a fixed period of time.52 
Congress should also update the voting rights litigation process.  
While Issacharoff believes disclosure alone will “lessen the litigation 
burden on those challenging suspected official misconduct” by setting 
“the template for either DOJ challenge or private party challenge, with 
the disclosure serving as the prima facie evidentiary basis,”53 he is 
probably overly optimistic.  Despite disclosure under oath, some clever 
politicians intent on implementing a change can probably devise a pre-
text that satisfies the formal disclosure requirements and is technically 
true without providing an easy roadmap upon which to file a voting 
rights lawsuit.  Instead, disclosure’s true benefit is likely the deterrence 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 117. 
 48 See id. at 118. 
 49 See id. at 117 (“One reading of the Court’s opinion is that the race discrimination structure 
of section 5 could not be justified . . . .”). 
 50 Shelby Counter v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“We issue no holding on § 5 itself, 
only on the coverage formula.”). 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). 
 52 See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dy-
namic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2037 (2010) (observing that Congress could allow a find-
ing of discriminatory effect to trigger coverage under section 3(c)). 
 53 Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 122. 
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of bad acts, and that could increase compliance and reduce the num-
ber of lawsuits. 
Congress should update the voting rights litigation process to make 
it less expensive, more expeditious, and more efficient in stopping dis-
criminatory procedures before they are used in elections and harm vot-
ers.  For example, litigation expenses often run into the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.  In addition to the attorney time required to take 
depositions and request and review mountains of paper, one or more 
expert witnesses are almost always needed to analyze data, and the 
cost of retaining these experts is only increasing.54   
States and localities generally have greater access to information 
about proposed election law changes, and the updated VRA should 
lower costs by shifting more responsibility to states and localities to 
show in court that a change is fair and that less harmful alternatives 
do not exist.  The burden-shifting framework in the federal employ-
ment discrimination context is a good model.  (Issacharoff believes that 
new election rules could be “effectively scrutinized even under a ra-
tional relations standard of review,”55 which would do little to lower 
the cost of litigation and would leave too many unfair voting rules in 
place.)  Along these same lines, a modern VRA should update section 2 
litigation standards designed for redistricting cases so that they more 
effectively address other problems — such as hurdles to casting a  
ballot.56 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Issacharoff’s “beyond discrimination” approach is incom-
plete.  We need not choose between the Fifteenth Amendment and the 
Elections Clause — we can work simultaneously both to prevent racial 
discrimination in voting and to improve access to the franchise for all 
Americans.  To that end, Congress should require disclosure not only 
in federal elections using the Elections Clause, but also in state and lo-
cal elections using the Fifteenth Amendment.  Further, Congress 
should update preclearance so that it is closely tied to areas with con-
temporary voting rights violations, and it should streamline voting 
rights litigation. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 See Note, Admitting Doubt: A New Standard for Scientific Evidence, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
2021, 2023 (2010) (describing the Court’s cases allowing trial judges to serve a gatekeeping func-
tion with respect to expert testimony).  Although the Voting Rights Act provides a successful 
plaintiff with reasonable expert fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (1965), the substantial upfront cost to 
plaintiffs may act as an obstacle to securing voting rights. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579 
(2013); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights 
Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006). 
